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1 Introduction
In times of low growth and low investment, policies that can improve ag-
gregate investment and aggregate output are especially welcome. Given the 
high level of public debts in most developed countries, however, the measures 
under scrutiny should pay for themselves, and should not require alternative 
nancing for the government. This puts a decrease in capital taxation on the 
table as an alternative to be taken into account. Reduced capital taxation
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in the steady state, along with a corresponding increase in labor taxation,
increases eciency: this is a well known result since the work of Chamley
(1986) and Judd (1985). Although Carey and Tchilinguirian (2000) estimate
that, for the OECD countries, there has been a shift in the relative tax bur-
den from capital to labor, the prescription of not taxing capital is not being
taken seriously by policy makers. One reason invoked, among others, is the
regressive character of the elimination of the capital income tax, when ac-
companied by the increase of labor income taxation if the same pattern of
government expenditures has to be nanced. In short, the policy recommen-
dation of eliminating the tax on capital is a weak one, if it leads to a decline
of the welfare of the poorest households in the economy.
This article uses a general equilibrium framework to show that the eect
on equity caused by the elimination of the tax on capital could theoretically
depend mainly on the joint distribution of characteristics that determine
the society's heterogeneity. However, using the empirical evidence on cross-
sectional distribution, we show that this result is mainly driven by the degree
of eective international mobility of capital. In the case of a small open
economy with perfect capital mobility, which decides unilaterally to change
policy, we show that inequality is reduced. The intuition for this result
is simple: when capital taxation is eliminated, the net return on capital
declines in the rst period, and net wages in the new steady state are always
higher, since the eect of capital inows on the marginal productivity of
labor dominates the higher tax on labor. Since these wages are discounted
using the international real interest rate, which is exogenous to policy, the
total present value of labor income increases. Therefore, when agents dier
in both wealth or labor eciency, but wealth is more unevenly distributed
than earnings, the poorest agents are always better after the elimination of
capital taxation.
This result is in clear contradiction with the one in Garcia-Mila, Marcet
and Ventura (2010) or Domeij and Heathcote (2004) both of which use a
closed economy model. It is also in contradiction with the more popular
argument based on a partial equilibrium reasoning: the reduction of the tax
on capital and the increase of the tax on labor income increases the return on
capital and decreases the return on labor, and therefore benets the upper
income agents and harms the lower income agents. Therefore we try to
understand why the degree of capital globalization is a major determinant
of how the elimination of capital taxation aects inequality. To understand
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the contradiction, we use a closed economy model, similar to the one we had
for the open economy, and we repeat the exercise. This allows us to clarify
the apparent contradiction between our results and theirs. We show that the
dierence arises because, in the small open economy, the eect is mainly on
investment, while in the closed economy, because savings equals investment
in equilibrium, the eect is mainly on impact on the real interest rate and
on investment and savings in the long-run. The eect on investment in the
small open economy, when not accompanied by an increase in savings, is
immediate, while the eect on investment and savings in the closed economy
is a slow one over time, leading to a transitional period when instead of
capital inows, the economy suers a higher real interest rate over time. We
show that inequality increases for our calibration, but also that the intuition
leads to this being a more general result. Even if as in the general case
1, eciency increases for our calibration in the closed economy, using cross
sectional data, welfare declines for the two lowest quintiles of the wealth
distribution.
The choices of the model and of the method to compare distributions
of welfare across dierent equilibria allow us to separate the eect of the
change of policy on eciency and on equity in a very natural way. We
consider an economy with innitely lived households2. The households in
our model economy dier in initial wealth and in labor eciency. Since
we assume those distributions to be exogenous, we can replicate exactly the
particular moments of the wealth- and earnings-distributions that are crucial
to assessing the eects of the tax reform.3 Households have dierent levels
of eciency but are not subject to idiosyncratic shocks on these levels. The
elimination of idiosyncratic risk means that we are focusing exclusively on
1As claimed in Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1994) the increase in eciency of applying
the second best solution of capital taxation is mainly driven from the high tax rates in the
initial periods.In our exercise capital is taxed at a zero rate after period zero.
2Since accounting for the distribution of wealth is fundamental to assessing the con-
sequences of this tax reform, typical overlapping-generation models cannot replicate our
results. For an explanation see, e.g., Ana Casta~neda, Javier Diaz-Gimenez, and Jose-Vitor
Rios-Rull, (2003).
3In the model, households belong to the same group if they share the same earn-
ings/wealth ratio, and are thus aected in a similar way by the tax reform. Other studies,
such as Per Krusell and Jose-Vitor Rios-Rull (1996), use similar partitions of the popu-
lation. Taxes are used to nance transfers, but transfers are endogenous, and part of a
political equilibrium.
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the redistributive eects of the policy change, as in Garcia-Mila et al (2010)),
and not on its eects on risk sharing, as in Domeij and Heathcote (2004).
This last work also computes the optimal tax mix. In this work we do not
determine the optimal plan, but rather limit our analysis to the eect on
equity of a specic ecient policy measure. Two articles in the literature
are specially related to ours. In the open economy literature, Harberger
(1995) shows that wages decline due to an increase of the tax of capital in
a general equilibrium model of a small open economy, but he assumes that
the change in tax revenue is distributed lump-sum and that the tax on labor
income is maintained. As described above, Garcia-Mila et al. (2010) studies
the elimination of capital taxation in a closed economy. This economy is
calibrated for the U.S. aggegate and cross-sectional data, and that the poorest
are harmed by the change of policy is its main result.
The exogenous distributions of initial wealth and labor eciency, as well
as the conditions for Gorman aggregation, i.e. that there is a representa-
tive agent, considerably simplify the computation of the aggregate general
equilibrium eects. These assumptions allow us to perform the exercise with-
out a full characterization of the joint distribution of wealth and earnings.
The exercise can be developed using only a subset of the moments of those
distributions. To measure the eects of the reform, we compare welfare dis-
tributions before and after the reform. The method used is the one developed
in Correia (1999) to analyze distributional eects on models with heteroge-
neous households, and applied in Correia (2010) to study the eect on equity
of the introduction of consumption taxation. This allows us to extend the
Garcia-Mila et al. (2010) results to closed economies characterized by dier-
ent cross-sectional data. Moreover it points to and claries the crucial role
of capital mobility on the eects on inequality of the elimination of capital
taxation.
The paper proceeds as follows: In section 2 the household heterogeneity
is introduced, as well as the method to compute the eect on inequality of
policy changes. The conditions for the evaluation of a positive or negative
eect on equity are developed. Section 3 discusses the empirical evidence on
the joint distribution of wealth and earnings relevant for the question under
study. In sections 4 and 5 we develop the general equilibrium models of
the small open economy and of the closed economy, respectively. Given the
proposed preferences, for the rst one we can gave a result generic for any
parameterization, while for the closed economy we present a calibration with
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standard values for the parameters. Section 5 presents the conclusions.
2 Evaluation of Inequality Changes in the Model
Being the main objective of this paper to understand the distributional eects
of the elimination of capital taxation we begin by describing in this section
the roots of heterogeneity at the time the reform is implemented. After we
will discuss how we can compare the cross section distribution of welfare,
which depends on these individual characteristics as well as on equilibrium
prices, before and after the scal reform.
Households are heterogeneous in labor eciency and in non-human wealth.
Each household i has a deterministic labor eciency level measured by
Ei;which is constant overtime. This same household holds at every time
period, t , a stock of non-human wealth, Ait; which is decompose in every
period in physical capital, Kit; domestic bonds, Bit and, if the economy is not
closed, external assets Bit; being this decomposition chosen in the previous
period, t  1. At time 0 this individual non-human wealth, Ai0; is exogenous
and its distribution, jointly with the distribution of labor eciency levels,
Ei;characterize the sources of heterogeneity in this problem. Therefore we
assume that agents are identical in every other characteristic.
As described in Correia (1999), comparison of distributions can be very
simplied when agents are heterogeneous but Gorman aggregation is still
possible. Most used preferences fall under the class that allows for aggrega-
tion. Given cross section empirical evidence, we propose the type of prefer-
ences used in Greenwood, Hercowitz and Human (1988) (GHH), which are
characterized by a zero wealth eect on labor decisions. This characteris-
tic implies that households with higher stocks of nancial wealth work the
same ammount of hours than poor households, when having the same labor
eciency4.
Then preferences of household i can be represented by5
4As we will see below nancial wealth and labor eciency are positively correlated for
the known empirical studies. This implies that total wealth is positively correlated with
hours of work: richer households, with higher wealth also have higher labor eciency,
work more than poor ones.
5The qualitative results on equity is maintained with dierent preference representa-
tions. However with isoelastic preferences the increase of wealth has a negative eect on
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Ui =
1X
t=0
t
(Cit   N'it)1 
1   ;  > 0; ' > 1 (1)
where Cit and Nit represent the consumption and hours of work of agent i in
period t:
The intertemporal budget constraint of this household can be written as:
1X
t=0
Cit
tY
s=1
(1 + rs)
=
1X
t=0
wtEiNit
tY
s=1
(1 + rs)
+ (1 + r0)Ai0 (2)
where rt is the net rate of return of non-human wealth in period t, wt is the
net wage rate per unit of eciency at period t; and Ai0; the initial non-humam
wealth, is dened as Ki0 +Bi0 +B

i0:
It is straightforward to verify that, using the intratemporal rst order
condition of the household, we obtain the optimal choice of hours, given by:
Nit = (
Eiwt
'
)
1
' 1 (3)
So it is clear that hours of work do not dier across agents when these have
dierent stocks of Ai0 but the same level of eciency. When richer agents
have a higher level of labor eciency, they will work more than poor agents.
Substituting this expression in the utility function (1) and in equation (2)
allows us to redene the optimal choice of consumption over time as:
MAX Ui =
1X
t=0
t

Cit   Cit
1 
1   (4)
subject to:
1X
t=0
Cit   Cit
tY
s=1
(1 + rs)
=
1X
t=0
(Eiwt)
'
' 1
tY
s=1
(1 + rs)
(1  1
'
)
(')
1
' 1
+ (1 + r0)Ai0 (5)
hours, and the higher labor eciency is not enough to guarantee that rich households work
more hours.(see Garcia-Mila et al (2010))
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where
Cit = 
"
Eiwt
'
# '
' 1
(6)
Given the isoelastic preferences in transformed consumption, bCit  Cit   Cit ;
described in (4), the intertemporal rst order condition is given by
bCitbCit 1 = [(1 + rt)]
1
 ; t  1
This set of equations together with the intertemporal budget constraint, given
by equation (5), determine the optimal path of bCit for every household i as
a function of prices, the net wages path and the real net interest rate, and
endowments, that is, its level of labor eciency and of initial wealth.
Solving for bCit we can write6
bCit = Gt [fr10 g]
2666664
1X
t=0
(Eiwt)
'
' 1
tY
s=1
(1 + rs)
(1  1
'
)
(')
1
' 1
+ (1 + r0)Ai0
3777775 (7)
Note that preferences are homogeneous in bCit  Cit Cit:As well known,
due to Gorman aggregation, the indirect utility function can be written as
linear in the endowments. Using the denition of bCi in equation (7) in (4),
and dening the following monotone transformation of the utility index U ,
u = (1  )(1  )U 11 
the following expression for each household utility is obtained:
ui = H [fr10 g]
2666664
1X
t=0
(Eiwt)
'
' 1
tY
s=1
(1 + rs)
(1  1
'
)
(')
1
' 1
+ (1 + r0)Ai0
3777775 (8)
6Where Gt [fr10 g]represents a function of the sequence of net interest rates from t = 0
to t =1:
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where ui is the index of the indirect utility. As said above Gorman aggrega-
tion leads to an indirect utility function which is linear in the endowments.
As agents are characterized in this problems by two characteristics, we saw
that the indirect utility, ui given in (8), could be written as proportional of
a sum of an item linear in Ei
'
' 1 and of a second one linear in Ai0:
The utility of the representative agent, i = r; when wages are standard-
ized so that Er = 1 and Ai0 is the average initial wealth, measures the level
of eciency in this economy. Given Gorman aggregation this level is not
contaminated by the distribution of characteristics in the economy neither
by its change by the distributional changes imposed by a change of the equi-
librium. Therefore in this way we have a very natural way to decompose
that total welfare eect of a reform on a eciency (aggregate) eect and in a
distributional eect. We will now describe how we compute this last eect.
To understand the distributional eects of a change in policy, or the ef-
fect on equity, welfare distributions should be compared across policies. With
this aim we order households by increasing value of transformed consump-
tion, or increasing welfare, measured by ui : If i < j; meaning that i has
a lower value of utility than agent j;we say by short that agent i is poorer
than agent j: To compare policy 1 with policy 2 in terms of equity we use
the concept developed by Marshall and Olkin (1979): the relative dieren-
tial dominance7. This concept is equivalent to an ordering of distributions
of utilities (transformed consumptions) across households by the rst order
stochastic dominance criteria. Note that the ratio of transformed consump-
tion is time independent, that is bCitbCit = bCibCi ; and therefore is identical to the
ratio of the utility indexes (ui ):
ui
uj
=
bCitbCjt =
bCibCj ; t  0
Let any allocation, or price generally denoted by Xp , be the equilibrium
value of X associated with policy p: In our case p = 1; 2; respectively for
policy 1 and policy 2.
7We show in Correia (1999) that this criteria of comparisons includes the Lorenz crite-
ria. It is equivalent to the Lorenz criteria, or to a rst-order stochastic dominance criteria,
for the population as well as for any sub-group of the population.
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Denition (of relative dierential dominance): Policy 2 is equity improv-
ing (worsening) in relation to policy 1 i policy 2 dominates policy 1 in
relative dierential, that is :
bC2ibC2j > (<)
bC1ibC1j ; for i < j
If we want to compare the positions of any two agents in the two welfare
distributions (one for each policy), we compute what percentage of trans-
formed consumption that agent i, the poor, should give in case he exchange
position on the distribution with agent j, the richer8.We can therefore use
the compensation consumption criteria,

1  bCibCj

; that each agent should
experience to be as well o in case he moves in the distribution to the lo-
cation of any other agent. If this compensation decreases, ( bCibCj ) increases,
when we change from policy 1 to policy 2, we say that inequality has de-
creased, because bCibCj < 1. The choice of the index for individual utility and
the choice of relative dierential as criteria to compare welfare distributions,
free the comparison of welfare across individuals from the usual arbitrariness
of cardinality, by reducing it to a consumption compensation criteria.
Cross section data tells us that both wealth and earnings are not equally
distributed across households. What happens to condition ?? when both
dimensions, Ei and Ai0; that characterize the household, dier? Let us writeP1
t=0
(wpt )
'
' 1
tY
s=1
(1+rps )
 p and (1 + rp0)  p: In our exercise p = 1; 2; respectively
for policy 1 and policy 2. We can state that condition ?? depends both on
the general equilibrium eect on prices of the policy change and from the
joint distribution of characteristics that characterize the economy. The exact
conditions on these two factors are described in the following proposition:
Proposition 19: Policy 2 dominates policy 1 in relative dierential, if :
8The compensation bCibCj implies that, after changing to the location of agent j ,agent i
will have
 bCibCj
 bCj = bCi:Therefore agent i would give 1  bCibCj
 bCj to maintain its initial
value bCi:
9This is Proposition 2 in Correia (2010).
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a) 
2
2
 1
1
and
b) Ei
'
' 1
Ai0
 Ej
'
' 1
Aj0
for all i and j such that bCi < bCj.
Proof. We can rewrite relative utilities as:
bCibCj =
Ai0
Aj0
[=] Ei
'
' 1
Ai0
+ 1
[=] Ej
'
' 1
Aj0
+ 1
: (9)
To understand the eect of the elimination of capital taxation on equity,
we can write the change of bCibCj (in percentage); when policy 1 is replaced by
policy 2; as10
dbCibCj
2
1
' d=21
0@11Ai0Aj0bC1i bC2j
1A0@Ei '' 1
Ej
'
' 1
  Ai0
Aj0
1A : (10)
Using (??) we can say that policy 2 dominates policy 1 if
cbCibCj
2
1
> 0: Sucient
and necessary conditions for this to happen are:
a) d=21 > 0 and b) Ai0Aj0 < Ei '' 1Ej '' 1 ;for bCi < bCj.11 .
Corollary: Policy 1 dominates policy 2 in relative dierential, if from
proposition 1 condition a) is not satised.
To understand the distributional eects of a policy change just saw that
condition a), and c), of proposition 1 depend on the aggregate general equi-
librium eect of the policy change on the ration =:This eect depends on
the specic environment and, in principle, on the calibration of the model
economy. This is the considerations developed in subsection 2.2 and 2.3.
However, on the other hand, condition b), and d), are stated as depending
uniquely on the distribution of initial state variables. This allow us to check
directly with cross section data whether this is satised. Next section will
10Where bX is the percentual change of X, that is bX21 = X2 X1X1 .
11Proposition 1would also be satised when c) d=21 < 0 and d) Ai0Aj0 > Ei '' 1Ej '' 1 ; forbCi < bCj :However we will see that this set of conditions is not relevant.
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discuss whether there are enough empirical evidence to distinguish between
b) and d) of proposition 1, and whether this fact is common to developed
and developing countries.
3 Empirical facts on the endowments distri-
bution
Our aim in this section is to show that the conditions to satisfy b) from
Proposition 1 are quite general. So we will use empirical studies on cross
section date or other that had to organize that data in a way that allow us
to validate or not that condition b). As we aim to reach a general result we
use studies that analyze data of dierent countries.
From Budria et al. (2002) we use two dierent set of empirical obser-
vations. First, their comparison of the top 1% with the bottom 40% of the
distributions for wealth and earnings in the 1980's for the U.S (Table 1 of
the appendix). And second, the partition of the sample in wealth quintiles
from which we compute the average ratio of Ei
'
' 1
Ai0
for every quintile (Ta-
ble 2 of the appendix).12 From Table 1 the ratio between the top 1% and
the bottom 40% for wealth and for earnings can be computed. Earnings is
the right measure to compute the vector of Ei
'
' 1 ; because earnings across
households in our model are linear in Ei
'
' 1 ; with a coecient that is con-
stant across households. Those ratios are respectively 1,335 and 158, so that
E40
'
' 1
E1
'
' 1
 A40;0
A1;0
, where 1 and 40 are, respectively, the top 1% and the bottom
40% groups of this two distributions.
The information on the distribution of Ei
'
' 1 from the partition of the
wealth into quintiles is taken from Table 2 of the appendix. These values are
standardized such that the representative agent has Ei
'
' 1 = 1:We obtain the
vector [:4; :7; :8; 1; 2:1]. An alternative would be to use data presented in
Garcia-Mila et al (2010), also for the U.S., and compute the same vector from
their wage distribution. In this case we would obtain [:4; :5; :8; 1:5; 3:2] _:To
obtain the distribution of Ei
'
' 1
Ai0
the two vector were used together with the
vector [0; :02; :08; :3; 1:3]13. We obtain the following data for the inverse of
12See Tables 1 and 2 in Appendix.
13Which is standartized data to obtain the average initial capital used in the model
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the ratio Ei
'
' 1
Ai0
:
Table 1
Ai0
Ei
'
' 1
(quintiles)1st2nd3rd4th5th
Budria et al 0 .03 .1 .3 .6
Garcia-Mil et al 0 .04 .1 .2 .4
Notice that, for both data sets, the ratio Ei
'
' 1
Ai0
is decreasing with wealth.
It is easy to generalize this result to see that Ei
'
' 1
Ai0
declines with the in-
crease in wealth, and the two characteristics are weakly positively correlated.
Both pieces of evidence imply that condition b) of proposition 1 is satis-
ed.
We can verify that condition b) of proposition 1 is satised for a large
set of combinations in the space of initial wealth and eciency levels: If
wealth distribution is more unequally distributed than earnings (or wages)
and wealth is weakly correlated with earnings14 then Ei
'
' 1
Ai0
declines with the
increase in wealth.
How robust is this evidence to dierent periods and economies? The
described general characteristics of the U.S. distributions of earnings and
wealth did not change during the 1990's, and they are common to a large
set of European economies, as shown in Budria and Diaz-Gimenez (2007).
When trying to infer for developing countries, like Latin America, data is
more scarce. Even if inequalities in education, earnings and income have been
extensively studied in Latin America, very little is known about the distrib-
ution of wealth in this region. However the study of Torche and Spilerman
(2008), which focus on the distribution of dierent assets types across some
economic strata, allow us to infer that condition b) of proposition 1 is even
more clear in that regions. As claimed in that study: " In all countries for
which wealth data is available, the Gini index for household wealth exceeds
economy, 1.7, and the rst quintile was transformed from a negative value to zero wealth.
14The correlation can be negative depending on the partition in quintilesbeing not by
wealth but by the ratio of earnings to wealth. In this case our case is even stronger.
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the Gini for household income". We can claim that condition b) depends
mainly on wealth being more concentrated than earnings and on those two
variable being positively correlated, and that these two characteristics of the
joint distribution of wealth and earnings are robust across time and space.
Therefore the following result can be stated:
Result 1:Condition b) of Proposition 1 can be written as Ai0
Aj0
< Ei
'
' 1
Ej
'
' 1
:
Using the same relative dierential concept to compare wealth and earnings
distributions we can say, for bCi < bCj, that this condition is in general satised
if wealth is more unequally distributed than earnings.
Having stated that condition b) is a robust one for most developed and
developing countries the elimination of capital taxation on inequality will
depend exclusively on the eect of the policy change on =(see proposition
1). Below it is compared the eect of the change of policy on =;in the
small open economy and in the closed economy.
4 The elimination of capital taxation in a small
open economy
The model represents an open economy with perfect capital mobility, where
the net international real interest rate, r; is exogenous to the country policy.
There is only one good produced and imported. Technology is characterized
by a neoclassical production function which uses as inputs capital, K; and la-
bor measured in units of eciency, EN; F (K;EN): The government spends
a constant exogenous ow of per capita expenditures, G; and taxes labor and
capital income, at the origin, at the tax rates n and k; respectively. The
assumption that the system of taxing capital income is the territorial system
implies that the income of external assets held by domestic households, B;
is not subject to taxation. The real net return of these assets is the net
international real interest rate, r: This constant rate is the one that char-
acterizes the steady state of the rest of the world, which we assume to have
fundamentals (technology and preferences) identical to the small economy.
Preferences and households endowments are the ones described above in sec-
tion 2. As said above the vector of Ai0 is considered to be exogenous, as well
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as its composition. Any change in fundamentals not expected in period  1;
as the change of policy that we want to study, leads to incomplete markets
at period 0: This predetermination implies that r0 (the net return on wealth
at the period of the annoucement and implementation of the new policy) can
be dierent from r:These assumptions imply that, following the change of
policy and with no costs of adjustment of capital, the economy will converge
immediately to the new steady state, after one period that diers because
the stock of capital in that period was decided previously without the new
information. Policy is summarized by a constant stream of government con-
sumption, G; nanced with proportional constant taxes on labor income, n;
and by proportional taxes on the return of capital net of depreciation, kt:
The objective of this section is to analyze the eects on the aggregate
general equilibrium in this economy of the elimination of capital taxation. For
this we compare policy 1, where the economy is characterized by a constant
positive tax rate on capital and a constant positive tax on labor, with policy
2, where the economy is characterized by that same capital tax in period
zero but with a zero tax rate on capital afterwards and by a constant tax on
labor income.
Given Gorman aggregation the general equilibrium of this economy is
characterized by equations (3), (6)and (7), with rs = r
; for the representa-
tive agent, i = r; non-Ponzi game conditions for the external debt, and the
following equations:15,16
15For simplicity we impose that the initial government debt is zero.
16We will represent the partial derivative of function F (:) in order to the ith argument
as Fi:
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Yt = F (Krt; ErNrt) = Crt +G+Krt+1   (1  )Krt +Brt+1   (1 + r)Brt
Kr0  1M
PM
i=0Ki0;B

r0 =
1
M
PM
i=0B

i0
Er  1
1+r
r G = n
P1
t=0
F2tNrt
(1+r)t +
P1
t=0
kt(F1t )Krt
(1+r)t
r0 = (1  k0)(F10   )
r = (1  kt)(F1t   ); t  1
wt = (1  n)F2t
Because we assumed that the international real net interest rate is at the
steady state level, r = 1

 1, and bCit = bCi; i.e., the transformed consumption
is constant over time for every household.
As already described the representative agent is the household with the
weighted average labor eciency level of the economy17 and with the average
stock of initial non-human wealth, Ar0. Given preferences and technology,
the international real interest rate, as well as the initial average stock of
physical capital and of external assets, and given policy instruments (G; n
and kt); the aggregate general equilibrium of this small open economy can be
computed. This aggregate equilibrium is dened by r0;a sequence of prices
wt; and a sequence of allocations
n
Nrt; Cr; Krt+1; B

rt+1
o
:
As described above, the indirect utility of every household can be written
as (8), that is exactly identical to the constant value of the transformed
consumption bCi  Ci   Ci:
ui = bCi = r1 + r
24 1X
t=0
(wtEi)
'
' 1
(1 + r)t
(1  1
'
)
(')
1
' 1
+ (1 + r0)Ai0
35 (11)
It is well established in the literature18 that policy 2 is the best solution to
nance G; when lump-sum taxes are not available and the available taxes are
17As said before we choose wage units such that this average eciency level is one.
18See for example Correia (1996).
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restricted to be the tax on labor income and capital income19. Then, policy
2 is always more ecient than policy 1, i.e. the utility of the representative
agent is higher in 2 than in 1.
The eect on eciency, or the eect on utility of the representative agent,
i = r; can be measured by comparing20
ur = bCr = r1 + r
24 1X
t=0
(wt)
'
' 1
(1 + r)t
(1  1
'
)
(')
1
' 1
+ (1 + r0)Ar0
35 (12)
across policies. The result that eciency is higher with policy 2 than with
policy 1 implies that:
1X
t=0
(w2t )
'
' 1
(1 + r)t
(1  1
'
)
(')
1
' 1
+(1+r20)Ar0 >
1X
t=0
(w1t )
'
' 1
(1 + r)t
(1  1
'
)
(')
1
' 1
+(1+r10)Ar0 (13)
The neoclassical production function implies that the marginal produc-
tivity of capital and the marginal productivity of labor depend uniquely on
the capital labor ratio, Kr
Nr
: As the tax on capital income is constant (at
dierent levels) in both experiments for t  1; the non-arbitrage condition
between physical capital and external assets, r = (1  kt)(F1t   ); implies
that Kr
Nr
is constant over time; as well as the marginal productivity of labor,
for t  1: The constant labor income tax rate then leads to a constant net
wage for t  1 in every case.
Let us assume that technology is Cobb-Douglas, that is
Yt = AK

rtN
1 
rt
: For t = 0 and using the denition of the marginal productivity of labor,
F20(
Kr0
Nr0
) = A(1  )

Kr0
Nr0

; and equation (3) we obtain
w0 = A(1  n)(1  )

Kr0
Nr0

19The period zero tax on capital income, which is a lump-sum tax, is constrained to its
value at policy 1;so that lump-sum taxes are identical at policy 1 and 2:
20For the small open economy G

r1t+1
	
= r

1+r :
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Nr0 = (
w0
'
)
1
' 1 (14)
Eliminating w0 we can write
'N
' (1 )
r0 = A(1  n)(1  )Kr0 (15)
As ' > 1; then '   (1   ) > 0; and since  2n >  1n; then by equation
(15)N2r0 < N
1
r0: As capital in period zero is predetermined
Kr0
Nr0
increases with
the higher tax on labor. This increase in the capital labor ratio implies a
decrease of the marginal productivity of capital. Therefore gross real interest
rate decreases. Since by assumption  1k0 = 
2
k0; we obtain:
Result 2: The elimination of the tax rate on capital income for t  1;
implies that the net real interest rate in period 0 declines, i.e. r20 < r
1
0 = r
.
Using (13) and result 2 we can say that:
Result 3: The elimination of the tax rate on capital income implies that:
1X
t=0
(w2t )
'
' 1
(1 + r)t
>
1X
t=0
(w1t )
'
' 1
(1 + r)t
(16)
It is now easy to understand the general reason behind the increase of
eciency, or the increase of utility of the representative agent, associated with
the elimination of the tax rate on capital income in small open economy: The
higher eciency of policy 2 is not driven by a higher net return on capital,
which declines in period zero, but by the increase of the net present value
of human capital, even being taxed at a higher rate. The elimination of the
tax on capital income leads to a higher capital/labor ratio in the new steady
state of the small open economy, that has a positive eect on the net wage
stronger than the increase in labor income taxation, except for period zero
where the opposite occurs21. What condition (16) describes is a stronger
21Using equatios (14) we see that w20 < w
1
0:
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eect: it is a general result that, for t  1; not only gross wages increase
with the elimination of the tax on capital but net wages also increase, more
than compensating the decline in the initial net wage. This is the reason why
even having a lower net return on initial wealth, there is always an increase
of utility of the representative agent, t  1 after the elimination of capital
taxation. This is the general equilibrium eects, which goes in opposition
to the impact eect, or partial eect: the decline of taxes on capital income
after period 1 does not increase the net return on capital after period 1; but
on the contrary it declines the net return of capital on period 0: The increase
of labor income taxation decline net wages in period zero but increases the
net wages for t  1; in such a way that the sum of present values of wages
(or human wealth) increases.
Using the denition of  22and ;as well as after results 2 and 3, we can
now state that:
Result 4: In a small open economy in general = declines after the
elimination of capital taxation.
Being satised proposition 1, because condition a) and b) are respectively
results 1 and 4, we can state that:
Proposition 2: The elimination of capital taxation in a small open econ-
omy decreases inequality in general, both for developed and developing coun-
tries.
Given the robustness of result 4, it is easy to say that eect on the welfare
distribution would depends crucially on the roots of heterogeneity.
To understand this point let us assume that we had no information on
the distribution of cross section characteristics. To determine the eect on
equity of the elimination of the tax on capital income let us consider two ex-
treme cases in terms of heterogeneity: In the rst one agents have identical
labor eciency levels, i.e. Ei = Er = 1; and are dierentiated only by dif-
ferent initial levels of non-human wealth. In this hypothetical case condition
b) of proposition1 would be satised: the sum of the present value of net
wages would increase and the return on initial wealth would decline with the
change in policy. Then proposition 1 would be satised and inequality would
22In the small open economy  P1t=0 (wt) '' 1(1+r)t :
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decrease with the elimination of capital taxation. The richer agent is the one
that has more initial non-human wealth and the net return on this wealth
declined. Besides the item that tries to equalize welfare, the return on human
capital, increases its weight due to the increase of the sum of present value of
net wages. On the other extreme hypothetical case agents would have iden-
tical levels of initial wealth Ai0 = Ar0: In this case, when agents would dier
on labor eciency, the use of corollary 1 would imply that the move from
policy 1 to policy 2 worsens inequality. If the return to initial capital was
maintained and the human capital improves that the gains would be higher
for those that have higher labor eciency, that are the richer in this extreme
case. In top of this the return on the endowment on which they are identical
declines meaning that the share of this item, that is the one that equalize
welfare declines. Both reasons lead to a higher welfare of the richer relative
to the poor and therefore to higher inequality of welfare across households
due to the policy change.
However as stated in result 1 the empirical evidence points strongly to a
joint distribution of both characteristics across households, which is biased
to the inequality of initial non-human wealth. This explains why we get the
result stated in proposition 2.
Using this result for households with welfare smaller than the one of
the representative household, that is for i < r, we can say using directly
proposition 2, that bCrbCi decreases. The well established result that eciency
increases with the elimination of capital taxation in a small open economy, is
translated as an increase of the utility of the representative agent, bCr: Joining
these two results we can conclude that, for i < r, bCi increases more than
the utility of the representative agent, that is:
Result 5: In a small open economy the elimination of capital taxation,
compensated with an increase of labor taxes, leads to an increase of welfare
for every agent with a level of welfare below that of the representative agent
.
This is a strong result that claims that the elimination of capital taxation
in the small open economy will always lead to an increase of welfare of the
"poorest", together with the increase of eciency.
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In the next section we want to check the robustness of the result above to
environments where the net interest rate is endogenous to policy. The most
natural environment to study this question is when the economy is a closed
economy.
5 The elimination of capital taxation in a closed
economy
The environment of the small open economy described in section 4 is a par-
ticular one, in the sense that, after period zero, the real interest rate does
not react to the change of policy under study. This assumption would no
more be true in the case of a closed economy. The point in this section is to
understand why the change from a small open economy to a closed one can
revert completely the results, and recover the results in Domeij and Heath-
cote (2005) or in Garcia-Mila et al (2010). In those works the elimination
of capital taxation in a closed economy leads to a decline in welfare of the
poorest households of the economy. Their exercise is implemented in an
environment which is not Gorman amenable, since preferences are not quasi-
homothetic in Garcia-Mila (2010) and markets are incomplete in Domeij and
Heathcote (2005)23.
The environment now is exactly identical to the one described before,
except that there is no capital mobility across countries. Therefore the trade
balance cannot be temporary positive or negative: in every time period the
supply of goods given by the production of domestic rms has to equalize
the sum of private and public consumption and investment. As in the small
open economy, in the closed economy the change of policy aects the capital
to labor ratio in the new steady state, but in addition it also creates a long
period of transition during which wages and interest rates dier from the
older and from the new steady state. When capital taxes are eliminated, and
compensated by a higher constant labor tax, the economy converges from the
steady state path associated with policy 1 to the one associated with policy 2.
The equilibrium is characterized by the same set of equations as before, but
23The no-risk case of Domeij and Heathcote (2005) is Gorman agregable but the authors
maintain eciency levels identical across households, and do not emphasize the separation
between eciency and equity that is done in the present exercise.
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the households budget constraint is now given by the generic intertemporal
budget constraint, equation (5), repeated here
1X
t=0
Cit
(1 + r0)
tY
s=1
(1 + rs)
=
1X
t=0
wtEiNit
(1 + r0)
tY
s=1
(1 + rs)
+ Ai0 (17)
Notice that the only dierence from (2) is that the net real interest rate is
no more constant nor exogenous. It reacts to the policy change. It will be
given by
rt = (1  kt)(F1t   ); t  1
The resources constraint is now given, for every t; by
Yt = F (Kt; Nrt) = Crt +G+Krt+1   (1  )Krt
Note that the closed economy assumption implies that Bit = 0.
We use the standard calibration for annual data. Preferences are such the
' = 1:8;  = 2:34;  = 1:001 and  = :96: The technology is Cobb Douglas,
the share of capital is :4 and depreciation is :10: The scal calibration was
such that, k = :5
24 and n = :23; which are the average marginal tax rates on
capital and the average tax on labor computed in Carey and Tchilinguirian
(2000), who update Mendoza et al. (1994) methodology for the period 1980-
97. This values are similar to the ones calculated by McGrattan, Rogerson &
Wright (1997) for the period 1947-8725. Preference parameters and policy are
consistent with N = :25 and G=Y = :19:Government spending is such that
intertemporal budget is balanced in this benchmark. Preference parameters
lead to an elasticity of labor supply of 1:2526:
We compute the steady state of this model, which we denominate bench-
mark. If there would be no policy changes (policy 1) the economy will be
characterized by this solution. Then we solve the model for the same values
of parameters and G but imposing that k0 = :5 and kt = 0; for t  127; and
n invariant over time.
24Note that this tax is on capital income net of depreciation.
25These authors use an average tax rate on capital of .57.
26This value is near the one found in Chang, Kim, Kwon and Rogerson (2011).
27As claimed in Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1994) the increase in eciency of applying
the second best solution of capital taxation is mainly driven from the high tax rates in the
initial periods.
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The following table summarizes the information necessary for the exercise
under study:
Table 1
bur () =
Benchmark
k = :5; n = :23
5:6 (1) 3:7
Elimination of capital taxation
k = 0; n = :35
5:8 (1:02) 2:9
where bur is the value of welfare for the representative household at the
benchmark, and  is the change of consumption, relative to the benchmark, in
percentage, so that the representative household would be indierent between
the benchmark and the new equilibrium. As described in the section above,
the last column give us the ratio of the total return on human wealth to the
return on initial non-human wealth, that is =  P1t=0 (wt) '' 1tY
s=1
(1+rs)
=(1 + ro):
Given the results obtained in section 3 and using proposition 1, the eect
on inequality of the elimination of capital taxation, depends of the eect
of policy on =, that whether condition a) of that proposition is satised.
However, contrary to what happen in the small open economy, in the closed
economy the value of = declines with the elimination of capital taxation,
meaning that that condition is not satised28. Then we can state that
Proposition 3: The elimination of capital taxation in a closed economy
increases inequality.
Therefore it is clear that the opposite distributional eects of the elimi-
nation of capital taxation in the open and in the closed economy is due to
the opposite eect on = in each one of those environments. The means
28This decline is robust to dierent preferences, For example the same qualitative eect,
the decline of = is obtained with preferences isoelastic in consumption and leisure.
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that the path of wages and interest rates after the change of policy should
be compared in both environments.
Common to both is the characterization of the new the steady state: the
capital to labor ratio increases, due to the elimination of capital taxation,
when compared with the one associated with policy 1. Therefore in both
environments the net return on capital in the steady state is identical. In the
small open economy the net interest rate increases, immediately at period
1, to the new steady state value. However in the closed economy the net
interest rate, after period zero, jumps to a value higher than the new steady
state, the one associated with policy 1, due to the elimination of taxation.
It declines over time, converging during the transition from above to attain
the higher steady state associated with policy 2. This is the main eect
that helps to give less present value of wages for those that depend more on
labor income.29This, as well as the path of net wages, contribute to the a
lower value of = in the closed economy due to the change of policy30, in
opposition to the higher one in the small open economy.
We can say that in the open economy the elimination of capital taxation
leads to an immediate increase of the capital stock. We can say that it has
an immediate investment eect and a slow saving eect since the investment
is nanced by external savings. This increase will ceteris paribus lead to a
negative eect on interest rates and to a positive eect on gross wages. In the
closed economy savings and investments should be equalized at every period.
The increase of demand for investment without having enough savings, since
it is costly to decline consumption, leads to an increase of interest rates.
Therefore the investment and savings increase slowly to achieve the new
capital labor ratio at the new steady state. We can say the equilibrium is
achieved immediately in the small economy through increase in quantities
and in the closed economy by increase in prices.
In summary, is the change from a positive, in the small open economy,
to a negative eect, on the closed economy, on the sum of present value of
net wages, ; the reason behind the opposite eect on inequality in the small
29Gross wages would normally increases over time, being always higher that at the
former staedy state. But because taxes on labor income increases the path for net wages
can be above or below the initial steady state associated with policy 1.
30This intuition shows why the result is robust to dierent preferences, For example
the same qualitative eect, the decline of =; is obtained with preferences isoelastic in
consumption and leisure.
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open and in the closed economy.
The increase on eciency reported in the rst column of Table 131, given
that unequally increases, it is not enough to guarantee in general the eect
on the welfare of the "poorest". To analyze whether the poor are worse o
after the elimination of capital taxation we need more information on the
right tail of the joint distribution of earnings and wealth. Equation (8) can
be written as:
burbui = Ar0Ai0
[=] 1
Ar0
+ 1
[=] Ei
'
' 1
Ai0
+ 1
: (18)
Using the inferred endowments of labor eciency and initial non-human
wealth for the households in the rst and second quintile in gure 1, as well
as the average initial wealth of the economy Ar0; and substituting in the
expression above the values of utility for the representative agent, bur;as well
as the values of = for policy 1 and 2, given in Table 1, the utility index for
households in the rst and second quintiles, bui; can be recovered. We conrm
that for the cross sectional data of the US and for the calibrated model the
welfare of those households decline with the elimination of capital taxation.
The obtained decline of welfare for the poor of the economy conrm
the result in Domeij and Heathcote (2004) and in Garcia-Mila et al (2010)
that the the elimination of capital income declines total welfare because it
declines the welfare of the poorest households in the economy. As said the
method used by those authors dier from ours because they use non-agregable
preferences and/or no heterogeneity in labor eciency, when there are no
idiosyncratic shocks. At Garcia-Mila et al (2010) the equilibrium prices are
dependent on the proposed joint distribution of labor eciency and initial
wealth. Here we show that even if this is not the case in our model the
qualitative results are identical. This can be read as being ours a simpler
method, and simultaneously a good approximation for the results, or that
the distributional eects on the equilibrium aggregates are for this model of
second order of importance.
31That the elimination of capital taxation after period zero is eciency improving in a
closed economy is a well stablished result.(see e,g, Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1994)).
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6 Conclusions
We show in this article that the eect on equity of the elimination of the
tax rate on capital income depends in a crucial way on the globalization of
capital markets. Meaning that whether the elimination of capital taxation
leads to a change in the path of the real interest rate or to capital inows into
the country makes the whole dierence for the result. In a closed economy
the elimination of capital taxation leads to an increase of inequality trough
the change of the path of capital labor ratio and the eect of this on the
net interest rates; in a small open economy the unilateral decision of its
government to eliminate the tax on capital implies a capital inow that lead
to a real interest rate always equal (except in period zero) to the limiting one
of the closed economy. It is the capital inow in opposition to the change of
the net return that implies the increase of the sum of the present value of
net wages in the rst case and the opposite in the second one.
The result obtained for the closed economy can occur either because the
domestic capital market is segmented from the international market, or be-
cause, being capital markets open internationally, the change of policy is
taken simultaneously by every other country. Also in this case the adjust-
ment is done through changes in the net international rate of interest and,
in the limit when countries are identical, there is no immediate movements
of capital across countries but just a change of the interest rate. capital in
each country will increase slowly over time as in the closed economy.
Theoretically the eect on equity would also depend on the roots of het-
erogeneity across households. However the advantage of our method is to be
able to guarantee that the result is well dened: worsens inequality when the
country is a closed economy and improves when the policy change is realized
in a small open economy. The important characteristic on data is the robust
characteristics across economies that wealth is more unevenly distributed
across households than earnings.
Besides, as well established in the literature, the eect on eciency of
the elimination of capital taxation is positive, both for the closed and for
the small open economy. Both eects, this one on eciency and the one
on inequality, imply that the decision to implement that policy leads to an
increase in the welfare of the poorest households in an economy where the
change of policy does not alter the real interest rate, that is in the small open
economy. On the contrary the segmentation of capital markets in the closed
25
economy can turns this result round. higher
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Table1(Budria et al:(2002))
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Table2(Table7inBudriaetal(2002))
.Characteristics of Sample Households in Each Wealth Group
Household
Characteristics
Households in Wealth Quintiles
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
Total Sample
Average Earnings 16:9 27:7 35:1 42:2 90:1 54:8
Average Wealth  4:1 19:0 72:6 175:3 1; 177 288:0
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